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Disciplinary boundaries should be viewed 
pragmatically; indeed, with healthy suspicion. They 
should not be prisons of understanding. 
(Roger Cotterrell, 1998)1 
 
Abstract 
Existing methodological approaches to business and human rights frequently fail to address the 
broad spectrum of relevant issues in the field. Persistent disciplinary silos and normative 
limitations of key legal and governance instruments result in reductive normative approaches 
and ultimately in ineffective policies. Focusing on the normative environment covered by UN 
Guiding Principle No. 9, specifically on the intersection between business and human rights in 
international investment, this paper argues for the need to put forward interdisciplinary socio-
legal methodologies. It contends that any comprehensive methodology addressing the field 
ought to account for the specificity of existing governance models, the intrinsic dominant role 
of corporate actors and the socio-legal complexity displayed at the intersection of human rights 
with business and market mechanisms. The analysis developed is advanced not as a ‘model’ 
methodology but as an instance of mapping out how a relatively narrow governance approach 
can be enhanced methodologically in order to better inform research and policy design.  
 
Keywords: business and human rights; international investment law; bilateral investment 
treaties; socio-legal research methods; network governance; UN Guiding Principles 
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The intersection of business and human rights (BHR) discourse with the area of international 
investment law (IIL) displays certain contradictions. While both normative environments 
appear to seek human development as the ultimate goal, compatibility between the two cannot 
and should not be presumed.2 Highlighting essential points of tension between these competing 
normative discourses, this paper argues for the need to put forward complex interdisciplinary 
methodologies that build consistently on a socio-legal platform.3 Such methodologies would 
acknowledge the extent to which existing political practices determine the conceptualisation of 
governance structures, and would thus lend such structures to a more systematic use of 
theoretical and empirical evidence, as opposed to submitting them to a predominantly doctrinal 
analysis.4  
 
Over the past decades, international investment agreements, and in particular bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) have increased sufficiently in number and have acquired sufficient 
institutional coherence in terms of available ‘legal mechanics’ to allow one to speak about the 
distillation of a model BIT, whose features (albeit still disputed) are now advanced as features 
of customary international law.5 Equally significant have been the initiatives towards the 
                                                        
2 Sarah Joseph, ‘Human Rights and International Economic Law’, European Yearbook of 
International Economic Law 2016 (Springer, Cham 2016). 
3 The term ‘socio-legal’ is used here in its wide-ranging meaning as offered by the Socio-Legal 
Studies Association. It covers both theoretical and empirical work, as well as more policy-
oriented studies. The socio-legal methodological approach to the study of legal phenomena 
references a large spectrum of disciplines. While traditionally socio-legal research has bridged 
the divide between law and sociology, social policy, and economics, there is also an increasing 
interest in bringing together law and organisational studies, international relations, governance 
studies and disciplines in the field of humanities. SLSA, ‘What Is Socio-Legal Research?’ 
(Socio-Legal Research Centre - DCU, 12 March 2010) 
<https://sociolegaldcu.wordpress.com/what-is-socio-legal-research/> accessed 25 August 
2018. 
4 Sol Picciotto, ‘Critical Theory and Practice in International Economic Law and the New 
Global Governance’, European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2016 (Springer, 
Cham 2016). 
5 Horatia Muir Watt, ‘The  Contested  Legitimacy of Investment Arbitration and the Human  
Rights Ordeal’ in Walter Mattli and Thomas Dietz (eds), International Arbitration and Global 




formal development of model BITs and of regional investment policymaking.6 However, after 
an initial boom period, the field is now displaying a slow-down in processes of negotiation and 
signing of BITs, with a certain cautiousness being manifest in both developed and in 
developing countries.7 This phenomenon is accompanied by the adoption of a host of domestic 
regulatory measures that attempt to tame emerging transnational trends.8 Part of this 
cautiousness is linked to the perceived implications and consequences that BITs and other 
investment agreements have for democratic governance and human rights.9 
 
Signalling the importance of these implications, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (UNGPs) address trade and investment issues in several instances, with 
international investment and human rights being the focus of the UNGP No.9:   
States should maintain adequate domestic policy space to meet their human rights 
obligations when pursuing business-related policy objectives with other States or 
business enterprises, for instance through investment treaties or contracts.10  
 
Furthermore, the Principles’ associated commentary largely reiterates the same idea, namely 
that States remain the fundamental actors in resolving the IIL–BHR tensions. 
 
The domestic State-centred element is still, undoubtedly, an important aspect in mitigating 
some of the most egregious human rights violations that may take place at the IIL–BHR 
intersection. However, the perspective offered by UNGP no. 9 fails to capture the socio-legal 
complexity of this normative intersection. Certainly, the genesis of the current system of 
international investment is undeniably linked to the State actors’ initiative within the 
international arena. At the same time, important IIL developments (with both their normative 
                                                        
institutional perspective on the evolution of customary patterns, see Richard R Nelson and 
Bhaven N Sampat, ‘Making Sense of Institutions as a Factor Shaping Economic Performance’ 
(2001) 44(1) Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 31, 38. 
6 UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report 2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment 
Policies. Chapter III - Recent Policy Developments’ (United Nations 2012) 84–86. 
7 UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report 2012 - Chapter III’ (n 6). 
8 Ibid 79; UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report 2009: Transnational Corporations, 
Agriculatural Production and Development’ (2009) 30f. 
9 Anne Van Aaken, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: The Case of International Investment 
Protection’ (2008) 17(1) Finnish Yearbook of International Law 91. 
10 United Nations, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 




crystallisation and with their contestations) have transnational corporations (TNCs) at their 
heart, as major players that are actively engaged in generating and shaping a transnational 
regulatory environment for international investment.11 While the active role played by 
corporate actors within the investment sphere deserves to be scrutinised in its own right, the 
scrutiny becomes imperative when, in the process of exercising their power within the 
investment agreements sphere, these private actors also impact other key social spheres, such 
as the realisation of human rights, the protection of the environment, or the domestic powers 
to design policy. Against the backdrop of UNGP No. 9, which puts the State at the forefront of 
the protection of human rights against international investment-related challenges, thus 
focusing research attention predominantly on the State’s capacity for action, this paper argues 
for a more comprehensive methodological approach, highlighting substantial methodological 
lacunae manifest in BHR research at the intersection with the international investment field. 
 
A comprehensive methodological perspective is also presented throughout this paper as an 
essential prerequisite for policy aimed at supporting change in the way that the human rights 
and business intersection is addressed within the international investment domain.12 Suggesting 
from the outset the limited normative suitability of UNGP No. 9 – with its exclusive focus on 
State responsibility – for answering the complex BHR challenges stemming from the 
intersection of IIL and human rights, the paper highlights international economic law (IEL) as 
a fragmented platform upon which IIL and HR ‘link’ with difficulty (Section 2). It then focuses 
on BITs as a particularly challenging IEL field for those governments that wish to address the 
human rights harms associated with international investment agreements and for the agencies 
that aim to operationalise UNGP no. 9 (Section 3). The section highlights BITs as a domain 
that would specifically benefit from a socio-legal research agenda that brings doctrinal and 
non-doctrinal methods to bear on policy design.  Identifying points of tension in the doctrine 
and practice of IIL and human rights is, however, not sufficient. In this sense, Section 4 brings 
a much-needed focus on the theoretical underpinnings of the existing normative and regulatory 
set-ups in IIL. Drawing, in particular, on the networked governance concept and the 
                                                        
11 UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report 2003. FDI Policies for Development:  National and 
International Perspectives’ (2003). 
12 For the inter-relatedness of the various international spheres and the role of human rights, 
see Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, ‘OHCHR Statement by Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, Independent 
Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order at the 72nd Session 




implications this can have for addressing the points of tension between BITs and human rights, 
the paper highlights the complex and powerful role played by corporate actors in the current 
polycentric governance set up. Finally, Section 5 suggests possible lines of both theoretical and 
empirical critique of the proposed normative environment, highlighting the idea that the way 
governance and regulation are conceptualised remains essentially value-laden and 
ideologically driven and, as such, should be open to socio-legal lines of inquiry. The critique 
offered in this section proposes an engagement with the theoretical tenets of the networked 
governance perspective on international investment and suggests avenues of empirical 
investigation. In so doing, the paper sketches out the socio-legal methodological complexity 
that should underscore the linkage between BITs and BHR, suggesting that the responsibilities 
identified in UNGP No. 9 can only partially inform a coherent policy approach that aims to 
embed BHR in the international investment framework. 
  
 
2. International Economic Law and Human Rights Between Linkage and 
Fragmentation 
 
Over the past decades, the issue of BHR has progressed from a radical but largely ignored 
agenda towards a discourse now taken up by business organisations13 and, according to some, 
increasingly shaped by them.14 On the other hand, human rights are routinely used as the lingua 
franca of a constantly renewed attempt to taming corporate power, whether in order to address 
‘classic’ human rights issues, labour standards or environment-related issues, in order to shape 
domestic corporate governance, or to address bribery and corruption in the host countries. 
However, despite the raised awareness of the multitude of dangers that human rights are 
exposed to through corporate activities, the additional issue of the corporate role in the impact 
of BITs and IEL on human rights has largely been ignored. 
 
                                                        
13 Tom Campbell, ‘The Normative Grounding of Corporate Social Responsibility: A Human 
Rights Approach’ in Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu and Tom Campbell (eds), The New 
Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2007) 22. 
14 Jens Martens and Judith Richter, ‘Corporate Influence on the Business and Human Rights 
Agenda of the United Nations’ (Bischöfliches Hilfswerk MISEREOR eV; Brot für die Welt; 




Presented often as a catalogue of stray topics in search of consistency,15 IEL is a relatively new 
field of practice and inquiry, covering a more or less coherent set of domains. It includes public 
and private elements, such as economic relations between States as well as, to a certain extent, 
economic relations between States, business organisations and individuals.16 It also relates to, 
and is dependent upon, different professional spheres in contexts that go beyond mere 
regulatory implementation.17 While this state of affairs calls for an interdisciplinary approach 
to any policy-oriented research, such as the one that ought to inform the evaluation and 
realisation of UNGP No. 9, the various IEL spheres appear well insulated by a technical legal 
carapace. A methodological piercing of this carapace is therefore required to translate the 
intrinsic goal of UNGP No. 9 – embedding BHR good practice within the international 
investment environment – into adequate policies.  
 
The contact between IEL and other normative regulatory domains, such as international human 
rights law, has generated normative interfaces or ‘nodes’ at the encounter of two social 
discourses that address or affect the same social values.18 Such areas of contact are 
characterised by normative tension points, described by scholars as ‘linkage’ areas.19 Given the 
regulatory dimensions of the discourses in question, a doctrinal and jurisprudential 
investigation of the points of tension is, of course, always necessary.20 At the same time, given 
                                                        
15 Aurora Voiculescu, ‘Human Rights, Corporate Social Responsibility and International 
Economic Law: Strong Answers to Strong Questions?’ in Amanda Perry-Kessaris (ed), Socio-
Legal Approaches to International Economic Law: Text, Context, Subtext (Routledge 2013) 
222. 
16 Steve Charnovitz, ‘What Is International Economic Law?’ (2011) 14(1) Journal of 
International Economic Law 3; Isabella D Bunn and Colin B Picker, ‘The State and Future of 
International Economic Law’ in Colin B Picker, Isabella D Bunn and Douglas W Arner (eds), 
International Economic Law: The State and Future of the Discipline (Hart Publishing 2008) 
1. 
17 Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Sociology of International Arbitration’ (2015) 31 Arbitration 
International 1. 
18 Isabella D Bunn, ‘Linkages Between Ethics and International Economic Law’ (2000) 19(2) 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 319, 319. 
19 Joseph (n 2); Frank J Garcia and Lindita V Ciko, ‘Theories of Justice and International 
Economic Law’ in John Linarelli (ed), Research Handbook on Global Justice and 
International Economic Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 54; David Kinley, Civilising 
Globalisation: Human Rights and the Global Economy (Cambridge University Press 2009) 47; 
Elizabeth M Iglesias, ‘Human Rights in International Economic Law: Locating Latinas/Os in 
the Linkage Debates’ (1996) 28 University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 361. 
20 Robert Howse and Ruti G Teitel, Beyond the Divide: The Covenant on Economic, Social and 




the complexity of the regulated social spheres, a socio-legal approach that looks not only at the 
legal texts, but also at ‘the context in which they are created, destroyed, used, abused, avoided' 
is also imperative.21 Other spheres of analysis, such as institutional theory, governance studies, 
the sociology of organisations and development studies are therefore invited to contribute to 
the research agenda and, ultimately, to inform the linkage policies. Environmental studies, 
labour standards, socio-economic rights, (sustainable) development and more generally 
(global) social justice are only some of the potential disciplinary linkage points for IEL and 
BHR. The interface of IEL with these domains produce a variety of new substantive areas of 
policy regulation and research, such as public health, environmental science, public services 
and competition and consumer law, to name the most prominent. All these domains make a 
claim for the re-negotiation of the public sphere in ways that are significant for the normative 
core of IEL.22  
 
The research agenda focusing on the implementation of UNGP No. 9 ought to address the 
tensions present in the domestic and transnational public sphere. This would support the 
operationalising of new normative parameters and the development of best practice at the point 
of linkage between international investment and human rights.23 A normative linkage amplifies 
various normative risks that were already manifest both within the IEL jurisprudence and the 
BHR discourse, and also creates new ones.24 The strong, rule-based system of international 
trade, for instance, is unsettled by the idea of incorporating substantive external normative 
parameters, such as human rights and sustainable development, beyond the level of declarative 
statements.25 On the other hand, various social discourses, such as environmental protection, 
sustainability, labour standards and human development, have a lot to lose by outsourcing 
                                                        
21 Amanda Perry-Kessaris, ‘What Does It Mean to Take a Socio-Legal Approach to 
International Economic Law?’ in Amanda Perry-Kessaris (ed), Socio-Legal Approaches to 
International Economic Law (Routledge 2014) 6. 
22 Kinley (n 19) 3. 
23 Voiculescu (n 15). 
24 Richard H Steinberg, ‘Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: 
Regional Trajectories of Rule Development’ (1997) 91 American Journal of International Law 
231. 
25 Markus Krajewski, ‘Ensuring the Primacy of Human Rights in Trade and Investment 
Policies: Model Clauses for a UN Treaty on Transnational Corporations, Other Businesses and 
Human Rights’ (CIDSE 2017) CIDSE, Private Sector Group 16; Caroline Dommen, ‘The 
WTO, International Trade, and Human Rights’ in Michael Windfuhr (ed), Mainstreaming 
Human Rights in Multilateral Institutions; World Trade Organisation (WTO), ‘Human Rights 




decision-making and dispute resolution processes to strong international trade and international 
investment systems.26 Given the latter’s strength and normative roots, it may easily prove 
biased in favour of its traditional market rationale. The linkage process, therefore, must be 
scrutinised and pursued cautiously, allowing for an appropriate recognition of the normative 
distinctiveness of the linked areas.27  
 
In the meantime, two approaches are available for dealing with IEL and BHR linkage points.28 
One approach seeks a certain level of normative universalism, based on common roots between 
the linked social domains, building conceptual bridges by making use of terms such as 
‘development’ and ‘sustainability’.29 The second approach proposes a common normative 
basis that grows from consensus building processes, which reflect a shared understanding of 
the importance of key building blocks of our social life, such as democracy, human rights and 
markets.30 In reality, however, the approach is often a hybrid one, with the same linkage 
drawing both on universalist and consensus dimensions.31 In this process of normative 
balancing and negotiations, the normative paradigm of social responsibility at both corporate 
level and international level appears to be in search of a ‘soul’ for its homo economicus: 
corporate law tries to show its responsiveness to public interest by tuning into the social 
responsibility discourse and by buying into the ‘business case for human rights’,32 while IEL 
learns to speak the language of ‘linkage’ to human rights by coming to terms with new 
perceptions of its social role and by allowing new, amicus curiae voices to be occasionally 
heard in its dispute resolution forums.33 
                                                        
26 Valentina Vadi, ‘Beyond Known Worlds: Climate Change Governance by Arbitral 
Tribunals?’ (2015) 48(5) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1285. 
27 Voiculescu (n 15) 227; Frank J Garcia, ‘The Trade Linkage Phenomenon: Pointing the Way 
to the Trade Law and Global Social Policy of the 21st Century’ (1998) 19(2) University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 201, 204. 
28 Voiculescu (n 15) 229. 
29 Kathrine Gordon, Joachim Pohl and Marie Bouchard, ‘Investment Treaty Law, Sustainable 
Development and Responsible Business Conduct: A Fact Finding Survey’ (OECD 2014) 
OECD Working Papers on International Investment. 
30 Frank J Garcia, ‘Globalization and the Theory of International Law’ (2005) 11(Fall) 
International Legal Theory 9; Drusilla K Brown, ‘Labor Standards: Where Do They Belong on 
the International Trade Agenda?’ (2001) 15(3) Journal of Economic Perspectives 89. 
31 Brown (n 30) 92f. 
32 Angus Corbett and Peta Spender, ‘Review Essay: Corporate Constitutionalism’ (2009) 31(1) 
Sydney Law Review 147, 148f. 
33 Mary E Footer, ‘Bits and Peaces – Social and Environmental Protection in the Regulation of 





At the same time, the human rights’ claim to universality is itself a source of tension when 
intersecting IEL.34 As a now institutionalised discourse, it is generally accepted that human 
rights take precedence and that – in principle – markets should not be allowed to hinder the 
individual pursuit of welfare and happiness, either intentionally or through unintended 
consequences. Yet the choice between competing courses of action is considerably complicated 
by the fact that the neoliberal market underpinnings of IEL themselves build on a claim to 
universality that has recently been interpreted as being rooted in human rights. Put simply, this 
claim builds on the idea that the neoliberal model of market economy is uncontestably the best 
economic model for pursuing welfare and happiness. While the market itself does not ‘care’ 
directly about each individual, its individualism becomes its main virtue and the vehicle for 
pursuing human development.35 
 
Approaching UNGP No. 9 through a ‘linkage’ strategy – that is through a strategy that tends 
to blur edges rather than establish normative hierarchies between markets and human rights – 
highlights other aspects that need consideration. Conceptually, the market-centred position on 
the link between trade and human rights has brought about the idea of fundamental economic 
freedoms, which propose unfettered free trade as a quasi-human right in itself.36 Moreover, 
human rights law has recently been used directly by business actors in order to protect their 
economic interests,37 in particular curbing a public authority’s regulatory or enforcement 
powers. Human rights have been, therefore, converted, and some would say diverted – often 
through courts – for the protection of the corporate entity.38 The corporate duty to respect, 
                                                        
34 Voiculescu (n 15) 230. 
35 Paul O’Connell, ‘On Reconciling Irreconcilables: Neo-Liberal Globalisation and Human 
Rights’ (2007) 7(3) Human Rights Law Review 483. 
36 Nicolas Klein, ‘Human Rights and International Investment Law: Investment Protection as 
Human Right?’ (2012) 4(1) Goettingen Journal of International Law 199, 206; Timothy G 
Nelson, ‘Human Rights Law and BIT Protection: Areas of Convergence’ (2011) 12(1) Journal 
of World Investment & Trade 27. 
37 Marius Emberland, The Human Rights of Companies: Exploring the Structure of ECHR 
Protection (OUP Oxford 2006); Stefanie Khoury and David Whyte, Corporate Human 
Rights Violations: Global Prospects for Legal Action (Routledge 2018) 136; Winfried HAM 
van den Muijsenbergh and Sam Rezai, ‘Corporations and the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2011) 25(1) Global Business & Development Law Journal 43. 
38 Emberland (n 37); Anna Grear, ‘Challenging Corporate Humanity: Legal Disembodiment, 
Embodiment and Human Rights’ (2007) 7(3) Human Rights Law Review 511; Khoury and 




protect and fulfil human rights thus becomes coupled with the corporate entitlement to the 
human rights themselves.39 As will be outlined later in this paper, the move towards a 
domestically enforceable corporate ‘right to trade’, coupled with (transnational) institutional 
managerialism and with the ‘judicial’ norm generation flowing from international investment 
dispute resolution bodies, appear as the three key elements that are at work in the process of 
the ‘constitutionalisation’ of international investment governance structures.40 
 
On closer inspection, therefore, putting together a research agenda that supports policy 
development aimed at embedding BHR within the international investment environment, and 
thus operationalising UNGP No. 9, requires the consideration of a multitude of parameters.41 
The methodological parameters should, of course, include jurisprudential lines of analysis and 
doctrinal scrutiny of the various distinct yet ‘linked’ legal discourses.42 These will offer a legal 
insight into the normative and regulatory ‘linkage’, addressing the competing perspectives on 
the IIL–HR linkage areas, identifying points of legal tension and proposing eventual solutions 
from within the legal discourse. At the same time, opening the research agenda to 
interdisciplinary insights from numerous pertinent disciplines may shed light on understanding 
                                                        
39 Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Human Rights and Bilateral Investment Treaties: Mapping the Role of 
Human Rights Law within Investor-State Arbitration’ (International Centre for Human Rights 
and Democratic Development Report 2009) 23. 
40 A number of studies address such processes of ‘constitutionalisation’, suggesting that those 
processes that promote and connect trade and investment institutions, management techniques, 
and quasi-judicial powers of discrete bodies are seen as constructing a ‘constitution’ for those 
institutions (such as WTO and ICSID). This suggests that there are certain mutations that are 
taking place in the traditional notion of constitutionalisation. Such processes enable those 
institutions to consider and evaluate non-economic and non-free-trade goals outside the usual 
domestic democratic processes, which raises obvious issues of legitimacy and democracy. 
Deborah Z Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization: Legitimacy, 
Democracy, and Community in the International Trading System (Oxford University Press, 
2005) 22; Sol Picciotto, ‘Constitutionalizing Multilevel Governance?’ (2008) 6(3-4) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 457, 471ff; Martti Koskenniemi, 
‘Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes About International Law and 
Globalization’ (2006) 8(1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9, 21. 
41 Sabine Frerichs, ‘Law, Economy and Society in the Global Age: A Study Guide’ in Amanda 
Perry-Kessaris (ed), Socio-Legal Approaches to International Economic Law: Text, Context, 
Subtext (Routledge 2013) 37–43. 




the linkage in a socio-legal perspective and thus may support governance and policy solutions 
to the existing fragmentation.43  
 
 
3. Assembling a Research Agenda for BHR on the Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Platform 
 
Within the IEL landscape, the international investment regime is probably one of the most 
successful ‘new-style’ regulatory and governance systems. A vast and complex area that has 
evolved in a pluri-centred way, IIL is submitted with difficulty to government-led long-term 
policy strategies. Built on mechanisms that often place governments and corporate actors on a 
somewhat reversed power position, one can see with difficulty how the ‘spirit’ of UNGP No. 
9 can be operationalised by relying predominantly on government action. Based on a multitude 
of distinct investment treaties and economic agreements negotiated largely independently of 
each other, the international investment law system has created a vast transnational platform 
of investment and economic activity, which is based on special protections put at the disposal 
of the corporate actors. The foreign direct investment (FDI) pursued by business organisations 
on this treaty-infused platform is subject to a complex of legal norms stemming, on the one 
hand, from direct investment contracts and domestic, host-State law and, on the other hand, 
from international investment treaty and customary law. 
 
Ironically, investment treaty law, with BITs as a prominent area, and the BHR sphere, now a 
key area of international human rights law, have both solidified their roles over the past 
decades. Featuring ‘development’ as one of the privileged operational parameters – sustainable 
development, economic development, human development – both domains should have a lot 
in common and should work in synergy.44 However, due to the absence of appropriate linkage 
                                                        
43 For an interesting structuring of such research dimensions along the legal text, context and 
subtext, see Perry-Kessaris (n 21) 6–10; United Nations, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of 
the Study Group of the International Law Commission - Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi’ 
(International Law Commission 2006) A/CN.4/L.682. 
44 John Linarelli, ‘Law, Rights and Development’ in John Linarelli (ed), Research Handbook 
on Global Justice and International Economic Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013); Philip 




structures, in particular transnational governance ones, the two systems have grown in parallel 
and are conflicting in ways that undermine both discourses. 
 
As pointed out in the previous section, the normative and regulatory fragmentation of 
international economic law has generally proved to have severe consequences at the point of 
contact (linkage) between domains such as investment treaty law and human rights. This 
explains the decision to address the issue through the UN Guiding Principles, in particular 
through UNGP No. 9. However, focusing exclusively on the responsibility of the State to 
maintain domestic policy space sufficient to protect human rights,  UNGP No. 9 embraces a 
rather narrow approach that does not account for the transnational socio-economic complexity 
of the field and does not account for corporate actors as increasingly active and powerful 
players in the field.45 While the safeguarding of regulatory space by governments remains vital, 
designing policies for resolving BIT–BHR conflicts requires more than the preservation of 
domestic policy space. The fragmentation of international law has allowed an investment 
system potentially inimical to human rights to become embedded in market practices through 
global governance structures. Within such structures, domestic governments appear as just one 
category of actors (and not necessarily a primus inter pares). This process of weakening of 
State actors on the international investment platform has been largely facilitated by the 
institutionalisation of a ‘triangular’ relationship set up through investment treaties. Such a 
relationship allows transnational corporate investors to act under a public international law 
umbrella while protecting exclusively corporate interests and profit margins. This has eroded 
a place largely reserved for the State, entrusted with the preservation of State and public 
interests.46 Through an interplay of institutional set-ups, investment treaty provisions and 
arbitration activism, the relationship between private investors and their host States changed 
                                                        
Alston and Mary Robinson (eds), Human Rights and Development : Towards Mutual 
Reinforcement: Towards Mutual Reinforcement (Oxford University Press 2005). 
45 United Nations, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (n 10). 
46 Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J Biersteker, ‘The Emergence of Private Authority in the 
International System’ in Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J Biersteker (eds), The Emergence of 
Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge University Press 2010) 4; Martti 
Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’ 




radically in less than two decades,47 re-modelled into what can now be called a ‘global public 
sphere’, the impact of which extends well beyond investment.48   
 
As an international law instrument, an investment treaty creates legal obligations between 
member States. It is governed by the international law of treaties, with governments holding 
each other responsible for the realisation of the obligations assumed reciprocally under the 
agreement. In practice, these treaties also create complex legal rights for other entities as well, 
in particular for directly investing corporations, affording them a rather special position.49 
Based on the rights created through the BITs’ triangular set-up, TNC investors acquire the 
power to enforce the investment treaty, exercising direct agency in international law in ways 
that go beyond the realm of the private international sphere.50 This privileged position has been 
largely downplayed in IEL discourse, the treaty component in the FDI being presented as a 
mere complement to the contractual investment agreements and the domestic regulatory 
platform.51 
 
Yet, such ‘complements’ severely affect precisely that capacity of governments to preserve 
policy space and to act promptly when investment appears inimical to human rights and human 
development. Therefore, a BHR research agenda requires the unpacking of this ‘complement’ 
that leads to the BIT system and the corporate actors sometimes failing to deliver the desired 
sustainable development,52 and which can contribute to the undermining of human rights in 
                                                        
47 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later’ (2009) 20(1) 
European Journal of International Law 7, 9. 
48 Sol Picciotto, ‘Liberalization and Democratization: The Forum and the Hearth in the Era of 
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host countries. The analysis of key arbitration decisions has shown, for instance, that when an 
investor’s treaty rights conflict with the rights of the host country’s population or with the host 
government’s use of its regulatory powers, the investor’s rights – more often than not – will 
prevail.53 Moreover, the link between foreign investment, corporate activities and human rights 
has often been seen too crudely, through the lens of a simple and direct cause and effect link. 
On a closer look, the system is plagued by considerable deficits. The democratic deficit, related 
to the international investment institutional set-up, requires the input of political studies, 
international relations and critical democracy and governance studies in order to help 
understand the long-term social, political and economic implications of the negotiated 
investment treaties. Equally, the system appears afflicted by a deficit in integrated economic 
theory studies. The claim that the BITs establish a ‘virtuous circle’ for development has been 
long debunked,54 yet this fails to impact conventional wisdom about FDI and BITs. For a long 
time, the prevailing perspective has been that a welcoming environment for FDI would 
necessarily bring with it regulatory stability and economic growth, good governance and the 
rule of law, thus providing a fertile ground for overall human development.55 This has been 
used as a major argument in selling the drawbacks of BITs, such as the loss of regulatory 
flexibility. The premise of the virtuous circle has, however, been largely disproved, in 
particular in the case of developing countries,56 where it has been shown that BITs can equally 
breed exploitation, environmental damage, human rights violations, corruption and bad 
governance.57 Therefore, a research agenda questioning the balance of power established 
through BITs between the host countries and the investors requires a perspective that goes 
beyond a mere case-law approach. This would allow the debate as well as the policy 
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developments to be informed by other disciplinary perspectives, highlighting in a more 
systematic way, the economic, political and social implications of the BITs’ trade-offs.58  
 
The narrow perspective on the issue of the corporate impact on human rights on the investment 
treaties platform is still perpetuated by key international players. For instance, in a 2012 report, 
UNCTAD raised the issue of the social responsibility of corporate foreign investors 
predominantly in relation to the proliferation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
instruments, seen as impediments to international investment. In more recent documents, 
however, UNCTAD appears to acknowledge the need for reform of the international 
investment environment in order to incorporate social concerns.59 Yet, it has been suggested 
that there is a need for a more radical change of the investment treaty paradigm, which would 
balance the interests of investors and host countries through acknowledging directly the human 
rights responsibilities of corporations.60  
 
While not going as far as suggesting directly the inclusion of the human rights responsibilities 
of corporate investors in a model BIT, UNGP No. 9 raised, implicitly, some key issues. The 
integrated commentary to UNGP No. 9 links the weakening of the host country’s policy space 
to ‘the terms of international investment agreements [that] may constrain States from fully 
implementing new human rights legislation, or put them at risk of binding international 
arbitration if they do so’.61 In other words, the UNGPs refer implicitly to those elements most 
deeply associated with the ‘success’62 of the BITs, elements such as umbrella clauses, the 
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notion of fair and equitable treatment, the definition of ‘investment’, and last but not least, to 
the BITs’ dispute resolution mechanisms themselves.63 Similar concerns over the unfriendly 
terrain that the international investment system may represent for the protection of human 
rights have been raised in other fora. For instance, the final recommendations to the European 
Commission issued from the COST Action IS 0702, the Human Rights Partnerships section,64 
refer to the need for the European Union to review the existing BITs when those conflict with 
the Lisbon Treaty provisions on human rights and human development. Equally, the 
recommendations encouraged the development of a template for future BITs, a template that 
should respect ‘the capacity for public regulation with regard to human rights’.65 
 
 
4. Challenging Networks of Governance through BHR Methodology 
 
The spontaneous development of customary-like transnational regulatory spheres, such as the 
BITs and investment agreements generally, tends to perpetuate the myth of a practical, process-
oriented approach to rules generation, free from over-theorising and, most importantly, free 
from ideology. The underpinning theoretical perspectives, however, play a very important role 
in understanding, explaining and addressing the points of tension between the international 
investment regime and BHR. The research agenda aimed at investigating the UNGP No. 9 
normative environment should therefore go beyond a focus on the fragmentation of 
international law and the normative and doctrinal intricacies of BITs and BHR as competing 
and conflicting discourses. It is equally important that we scrutinise the governance model that 
is put forth. Such a model will contain embedded conflict management (prevention, resolution, 
avoidance) pathways that should address both intra (IIL) and inter-systemic (IIL and HR or IIL 
and environment, for instance) conflicts. In this sense, international investment has often been 
presented as following a transnational networked governance model, for which the parameters 
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of governmentality are anchored in areas that reach beyond the State.66 Within this model, the 
network concept is promoted as a tool for understanding and critically evaluating emergent 
transnational legal orders, such as the one of international investment.67 The governance that 
emerges in complex set-ups, such as international investment agreements, is a hybrid one,68 in 
which the public and private actors appear as ‘integrated stakeholders’,69 following a 
polycentric structure, rather than a hierarchical structure, such as in a court system or a 
government bureaucracy. Such polycentric structure occupies an ‘ambiguous space’ between 
traditional and market-centred regulatory assemblages.70 Against this backdrop of ‘networked 
governance’ beyond the State, and of processes of systemic spontaneous generation and 
‘customisation’ of regulatory and conflict resolution pathways, the de facto corporate power 
and sphere of influence require careful scrutiny.  
 
In the context of investment treaty law, it is largely recognised that maintaining an adequate 
domestic policy space by host States, as recommended by UNGP No. 9, has been put under 
considerable pressure. This pressure was applied largely through informal but forceful 
corporate influence,71 to the extent to which corporate actors appear as ‘steering subjects’ in 
international economic law.72 One of the key features that can be identified as enabling the 
steering role of corporate organisations is their capacity to take part in law-making processes 
and regulatory design. While involving various stakeholders in generating regulatory 
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instruments is not unusual, over the past decades, corporations have been engaging with States 
largely on an equal footing, influencing investment agreements that cater for their needs but 
that incorporate few, if any, of the key parameters of sustainable human development, such as 
human rights and the environment.73 The TNCs’ increased steering influence is also illustrated 
through their participation in IEL hybrid instruments, such as international investment ‘State 
contracts’. While the applicable legal instruments (domestic, international, mixed) have been 
extensively debated, the key element to be noted here is that TNCs regularly engage in such 
agreements at eye level with the States.74 Such processes have been increasingly promoting 
TNCs as key players in an emerging ‘transnational law-making community’,75 enhancing the 
fragmentation of international law and, more importantly, the fragmentation of the capacity for 
addressing economic and human development in an integrated way. Interrogating, therefore, 
the notion of governance and, in particular, that of networked governance,76 foregrounds the 
mechanisms through which human rights are affected and ultimately helps identify and address 
the governance deficit. 
 
Another equally relevant aspect of the impact of networked governance on BHR 
operationalisation is the steering role of corporate actors in international investment through 
their dominant position in the dispute settlement mechanisms and more generally, within the 
transnational governance network. More specifically, this aspect refers to the ‘mixed’ dispute 
settlement mechanism – between host States and corporate foreign investors – used as the most 
common way of resolving international investment disputes.77 In the context of a polycentric 
networked governance system, characterised by the absence of a hierarchical court structure or 
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even of a formalised precedent-based international investment jurisprudence,78 the ad-hoc 
arbitral tribunals are shaping the normative standards in a customary law fashion, with 
corporate actors playing a dominant role. While this is not an entirely novel process, the past 
years have seen a ‘strengthening of the position of TNCs in this regard’,79 and even a forceful 
promotion of such litigations.80 Corporate investors have also been empowered by the 
migration of the arbitration provisions clauses, from the respective State contract between the 
host State and the investor, as it more commonly used to be the case, to what are now 
investment treaty clauses.81 From a private, contractual entitlement to making use of arbitration 
options, the corporate investors got their legal status upgraded to direct subjective rights to 
investor–State arbitration conferred under international law.82 This institutionalisation of 
dispute resolution under international law must be acknowledged through the research agenda, 
not only as a means of application and enforcement of the law, but as a very powerful means 
of international law making,83 achieving an important step in the corporate actors’ transition 
from objects to subjects of international law.84  
 
These complex elements of the corporate regulatory positioning on the international arena take 
place against the backdrop of complex globalisation processes that are further conducive to the 
fragmentation of social and, thus, of regulatory spheres, displacing the State-centred political 
and rule-making processes towards multi-layered processes through which a host of actors 
interact and, more importantly still, through which corporate actors are perceived as 
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influencing unduly the agenda.85 In this context, the State appears to surrender ‘the production 
of public goods’ to corporate actors and other entities, such as non-governmental organisations. 
This renders the State leaner and yet capable to delegate implementing public tasks both at 
home and abroad.86 In the context of the fragmented competing and conflicting international 
law spheres, such as investment treaty law and international human rights law, the resolution 
of such conflicts is seen to be delegated (or surrendered) to networked governance structures 
beyond the State.87 Such structures, however, acknowledge with difficulty a clear responsibility 
for embedding human rights in their mode of functioning. There are no easily identifiable 
institutionalised points of access and established procedural obligations that can make the 
governance network respond promptly to social harm and tensions.88 As to the victims, the 
networked governance structure gives no address to send petitions and no customer relations 
number to ring and complain. Human rights prevention measures and compensatory remedies 
remain therefore to be provided by governments with weakened policy space and corporate 
actors that may or may not subscribe to CSR and the ‘business case for human rights’ doctrines.  
 
In this context, the production of governance and regulation,89 understood as public goods that 
are ultimately meant to address the fragmentation of the social spheres90 and to establish an 
authoritative hierarchy of values that prioritises sustainable human development over 
immediate market values, becomes in fact ‘denationalised’ and displaced from its social 
contract foundation. Yet, in the context of networked governance, this is not necessarily seen 
as a public governance problem. The idea is that, for as long as the processes of producing the 
required public goods continue (through networked governance processes rather than 
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stemming from State policies), the resulting normative selection and regulatory outcome will 
reflect some kind of integrated stakeholder perspective.  
 
Such regulatory systems are shaped in ways that express agreements and synergies that are 
generated from within the governance network itself. The governance system that emerges 
from such conceptualisation is understood to consist of ‘frameworks of institutional 
communication’91 that assemble a certain number of governance subsystems, such as private 
systems, global frameworks and autonomous corporate regulatory instruments.92 For instance, 
the promotion and realisation of human rights is largely dependent upon the dynamics of a 
network of governance forces that comprises State systems, corporate actors (as private 
governance systems that exert both internal authority – over their own internal structures – and 
external authority – over their supply chains, for instance),93 global governance frameworks 
(including, for instance, the UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework) as well as 
autonomous corporate ‘constitutional’ instruments stemming from institutions such as the 
OECD.  
 
In this (meta-)governance set-up, the barriers between public and private, and between hard 
and soft legal norms, are constantly blurred.94 In the context of such governance networks, the 
corporate actors emerge as ‘autonomous, functionally differentiated organisations’ which, 
within the scope of their network-generated mandate, exercise (internal and external) 
‘regulatory authority’.95 The rules that emerge out of the communications taking place within 
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the governance networks become binding96 and impact across both private and public spheres. 
Such regimes draw strength not from the traditional State authority, but through the 
acquiescence of corporate agents to those normative hierarchies and regulatory instruments 
that they have helped produce and that reflect the internal values of the corporate discourse.97 
This type of governance by contract and internal/networked production of norms98 is presented 
as a recipe for governance success and cost-effective compliance.99  
 
However, the extent to which such frameworks of polycentric governance, with corporate 
private actors as key players, can be instrumental in internalising human rights norms, and thus 
in defragmenting the various competing discourses within international law, remains to be 
further interrogated. Mapping out the actors and the nodes of the network, capturing the 
relevant institutional communications and grasping the nature of the communications taking 
place between actors will facilitate a pluridisciplinary understanding of a normative or 
regulatory point of tension.100 It is recognised, for instance, that corporate engagement in the 
dialogue on social values, such as human rights, is conditioned in particular ways. For instance, 
‘voluntary’ compliance is said to intervene ‘when massive learning pressures’ are exerted on 
the corporation ‘from the outside’, and the internalisation of societal values comes about, 
according to Teubner, ‘neither due to intrinsic motives of voluntariness, nor due to the 
sanctioning mechanisms of State law, but to a circuitous translation process in which different 
learning pressures come to bear’.101 Understanding what those pressures are, whether a 
governance network can generate those pressures, and if so, how, is crucial for embedding 
BHR in the international investment platform. 
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The networked governance perspective on the BIT system and the de facto power that corporate 
investors are understood to hold in the system102 ought to inform and shape the approach to 
understanding the context of UNGP No. 9. The relevance of this context should be extended 
beyond the immediate formulation of Principle No. 9 and of the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy 
Framework’,103 both of which place an important amount of the BHR agenda with the State 
rather than with the corporate platform.104 The issue of the governing of complex international 
spheres, such as international trade and investment, has long been recognised as overpassing 
the remit and capacity of a traditional system of international structures, which presupposed 
the State at its epicentre. It is thus time that the research approach on BHR ‘constitutionalises’, 
in its turn, a more comprehensive interdisciplinary research agenda, that covers essential 
complementary dimensions of doctrinal and socio-legal methodologies. 
 
 
5. Theoretical and Empirical Aspects of a Socio-Legal Research Agenda for BHR 
 
The important ‘technical’ success of international investment law as an expanding normative 
sphere, with its affirmation of TNCs as steering actors in ever more complex networked 
governance processes, seems to have reached a moment of intense questioning. Critical aspects 
stemming from both theoretical and empirical investigations question the capacity of 
transnational networked governance structures to achieve autonomously a satisfactory 
defragmentation of international law and to get corporate constitutional processes to internalise 
human rights. This invites the development of further research strands that are informed by 
governance studies and politics. Some scholars, for instance, offer a critique of the networked 
governance model by attempting to rehabilitate the political, that is the public register of debate 
and normative negotiation and reflection that is traditionally associated with processes of 
formalising normative hierarchies. According to this line of critique, the investor rights/human 
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rights normative hierarchy should be debated and resolved in such a public space, rather than 
through the opaque communications of a transnational network of governance. 
 
From this perspective, one can identify a number of dangers associated with the transnational 
networked governance model and with the co-option of non-State production of governance 
and regulation.105 First, there is the danger that the ‘constitutional’ process of production of 
governance and regulation that now takes place within the networked governance structures 
undercuts what we would typically associate with the ‘constitutional’, namely its deliberative 
framing function, i.e. the ‘constitutional’ as a place of social debate and contestation, that 
balances the public–private hierarchy.106 Within the network governance framework, such 
distinctions become largely obscured. Secondly, there is the danger that this loss of the 
constitutional framing function is further enhanced in the transnational sphere, due to the 
complexity of governance networks and to the absence of external supervisory structures that 
would bear direct responsibility for the public interest.107 Finally, there is the danger that the 
frameworks of institutional communication established within the networked governance 
structures are prone to market capture, in which case, again, the network remains only 
nominally political.108 Overall, this perspective highlights the risk of the collapse of democratic 
categories into market thinking, as well as the risk of politics that cannot escape the logic of 
price any longer.109 Therefore, far from being a sterile enterprise, an engagement with the 
theoretical frameworks that inform conceptions of politics and democracy becomes the 
cornerstone of the process of putting together a viable research methodology. It is through 
engaging with such theoretical frameworks that we can identify not only where the points of 
normative tension lie, but also how they arise.  
 
In addressing competing perspectives on governance structures, BHR researchers should 
combine the theoretical socio-legal perspective informed by political theory and governance 
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studies, while being mindful of internalising the specific (theoretical) issues of varied empirical 
contexts. Adopting such an approach would provide for a comprehensive methodology, 
complementing other discipline-bound and theoretical approaches. However, it should be 
pointed out that, while investigating BHR norms with the contribution of multiple disciplinary 
perspectives has its own difficulties, undertaking empirical research brings with it additional 
challenges. How does one investigate empirically complex networks that generate governance 
from multiple intricate nodes of opaque institutional communications? Which node of the 
network and which part of the network communications do we select for such an approach? 
The research agenda for such a topic resembles an investigative puzzle and can benefit from 
complex interdisciplinary and empirical accounts. From socio-legal approaches to 
investigating investment arbitration tribunals and international investment dispute resolution 
processes, to the scrutiny of international investment experts as an influential professional 
category, as well as the historical analysis of how investment treaties come to life or how 
investor-State disputes emerge or are discouraged, there is a mosaic of issues and approaches 
that could and largely should inform the BHR research agenda.  
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the aim here is not to propose a fit-all ‘model 
methodology’ that addresses the intersection of BHR with the international investment regime, 
but rather to map out lines of investigation that should enhance and expand the focus of 
instruments such as UNGP No. 9. For instance, whereas UNGP No. 9 focuses exclusively on 
the responsibility of States to oversee international investment and human rights, one other 
relevant line of inquiry would relate to corporate processes. In particular, such a line of inquiry 
would focus on the extent to which international investment can be seen as part of the corporate 
‘sphere of influence’.110 Such a perspective should invite – through the evaluation of context, 
impact and contribution – a jurisprudentially as well as empirically-informed corporate due 
diligence element of the BHR research and policy agenda.111  
 
Engaging with the theory through empirical avenues can equally contribute to the critique and 
understanding of the role of corporate actors within governance networks. The structures that 
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make up such networks are usually seen as a solution to the defragmentation of investment and 
human rights discourses, as a mechanism from which appropriately shaped norms, would 
spontaneously be generated simply through the civilised communications between the network 
actors. Stemming from the issue of corporate engagement within their sphere of influence, 
which it is argued, includes the very governance network, a second line of critique and inquiry 
derives from empirically informed research (in institutional theory and the sociology of 
organisations, for instance). Such research shows TNCs – key network actors – display three 
types of engagement with other social spheres and institutions: institutional avoidance, 
institutional adaptation and institutional coevolution, each with its own drawbacks for the 
human rights agenda.112 According to these perspectives, when faced with an institutionally 
weak environment, characterised by lack of accountability, political instability, poor regulation 
and deficient enforcement, TNCs will avoid engagement and adopt an ‘exit’ rather than a 
‘voice’ strategy. Alternatively, when faced with a weak normative environment, TNCs may 
engage by ‘adapting’ to that environment, emulating behaviour and commercial culture, or by 
making use of political influence and bribery, for instance. In other words, the corporate actor 
will ‘go native’. Finally, institutional coevolution takes place when the corporate actors are no 
longer content just to adapt, but aim to effect change in the local formal and informal 
institutions. A TNC might, for instance, engage in political activities in order to advance 
specific kinds of regulation or market structures that give it an advantage.113 In line with this 
perspective, the BHR research offers a plethora of empirical evidence, supported by doctrinal 
and jurisprudential studies of the international investment arbitration case-law, which can 
illustrate and support the pertinence of the three levels of the corporate engagement 
perspective.114 
 
However, engaging empirically with networked governance structures highlights challenges 
that go beyond the perspective on the three rules of corporate engagement mentioned above. 
As pointed out earlier, governance networks, such as the ones regulating the BIT system, 
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appear as polycentric structures, the geography of which is not always easy to trace with clarity. 
Such structures are not likely to offer clear pathways to remedy for human rights harm, nor 
will it be easy to ‘listen’ to the institutional communications taking place between the nodes of 
the network, a good number of those being subliminal. Yet, an effort needs to be made to put 
together methodologies that can capture as many of these communications as possible and 
could inform human rights-friendly policies aimed at the international investment regime. 
 
While the possible methodological avenues of investigation are multiple, the purpose of this 
paper has not been to draw an exhaustive list, but to tease the methodological imagination that 
would foster a systematic socio-legal multidisciplinary approach. Such a comprehensive 
approach would build on a mixed methods/mixed data methodology that blends quantitative 
and qualitative, empirical and theoretical socio-legal methodologies. It would identify key 
network nodes and focus on the alignment of interests of key actors as well as on the specificity 
of varied political contexts, thus functioning as a framework of analysis for the intersection of 
BHR with international investment and, equally, with other socio-economic spheres. Such a 
complex, empirically supported approach, identifying actors and institutional communications, 
could prove an effective tool of practical reflection and BHR policy design.115 
 
Ultimately, in complex normative set-ups such as the networked governance in international 
investment (many other BHR issues would qualify for same level of complexity), a key avenue 
of research would seek to map out disciplinary areas of empirical enquiry and to bring these to 
bear on the construction of the socio-legal puzzle of networked governance. This would entail 
deploying what one could identify as a methodological pluralism, that is a commitment to 
designing a research methodology that reflects the complexity described above. While some 
have argued for an investigative pluralism with respect to the legal points of tension in IEL 116 
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or EU law,117 what is argued for here is for BHR researchers to design pluralist frameworks of 
empirical and analytical socio-legal inquiry that would encourage the various disciplinary 
fields – some of which were highlighted in the previous sections – to carry out multidisciplinary 
conversations in support of BHR policies. In this sense, rather than focusing on analysing (and 
producing) ‘buffer’ zones around the ‘linkage’ points of tension discussed earlier in this paper, 
such an approach would undertake to explore the relevant points of tension. The use of multiple 
methodological tools would offer an account of the challenges that networked rule-generating 
poses to normative discourses such as human rights, rooted as the latter are in traditional 
deliberative practices. These challenges can only be apprehended ‘if they are seen in their 
entirety as segments of a broader regulatory cycle’.118 Rather than applying the same 
investigative frameworks to each actor or node in the networked governance structure, thus 
ignoring the huge differences in nature, role and the level of transparency of these actors and 
nodes, researchers can instead draw on an investigative methodological pluralism – perhaps 
even with the risk of creating ‘unruly assemblages’119 – in order to account for the complexity 




Business and human rights emerged as a field of political action and as an academic discipline 
at the intersection of multiple normative discourses, such as human rights, business ethics, 
commercial law, international economic law and international investment law, development, 
to mention just a few. It grew in what might be seen as challenging times for the domestic, 
international and transnational governance structures. Essentially an ‘intersection’ discourse – 
of legal, normative and policy fields, of hard and soft law, of domestic and trans-national 
governance – BHR should be seen as a fundamentally interdisciplinary socio-legal field of 
research and policy. Of course, approaching BHR topics from a mono-disciplinary perspective 
(be it legal, business and management, governance, or other) remains a valuable contribution 
to the field. Yet, as our reflection on UNGP No. 9 normative context has shown, from the point 
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of view of a research agenda that aims to inform a coherent and effective policy approach, a 
complex interdisciplinary, socio-legal inquiry becomes imperative. 
 
The sketching of the contours of an interdisciplinary approach to UNGP No. 9 should, of 
course, be seen only as an illustration of such an approach, not as an exemplar or ultimate 
‘model’ of a prescribed methodology. Different BHR issues will bring different challenges, 
and thus will inform different selections of methods and intersections of disciplines. The issue 
of governance models does appear, however, as a defining issue. In the case of  UNGP No. 9, 
it draws attention to competing normative and legal discourses, institutional set-ups and 
institutional communications. It equally brings into focus a requirement to map out the actors 
of the transnational network of governance, who shape investment treaty law to various extents, 
and to identify their characteristics, roles and power of steering.  
 
In particular, a salient approach to investigating linkage areas such as the one within the 
purview of UNGP No. 9 would be mindful not only of parameters of regulatory behaviour (i.e. 
direct regulation of instances of normative intersection between BITs/IIL and human rights), 
but also of the potential of research and policy to develop in ways that set out to integrate a risk 
analysis of economic, financial and BHR parameters. Informed by normative universalism and 
consensus building processes, the engagement with fields such as governance studies, the 
sociology of organisations, development studies, environmental studies, labour standards, 
socio-economic rights, (sustainable) development and more generally, (global) social justice 
would also highlight key points on the BHR agenda.  From the interface of IEL and IIL with 
these domains emerges a variety of new substantive areas of BHR research and policy, such as 
public health, environmental regulation, public services, competition and consumer law, to 
name just the most prominent. All these domains make a claim for the re-negotiation of the 
public sphere in ways that are significant for the normative core of BHR as well as IEL and 
IIL. In refining our interdisciplinary repository of methodologies, we can, therefore, aim to 
improve our access to the web of transnational socio-economic practices, while at the same 
time bringing the various levels of empirical inquiry to bear. We can thus help shape a more 
coherent and transparent policy approach to the current BHR challenges and, ultimately, 
produce genuinely sustainable human development. 
